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THE DARK SIDE OF GRUTTER 
Girardeau A. Spann* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Liberals have generally cheered the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Gruffer v. Bollinger1 as validating the continued use of af-
firmative action in the struggle against racial injustice.2 But the 
Supreme Court's modern race cases rest on a misunderstanding 
of the nature of contemporary racial discrimination. From 
Brown,3 to Bakke,4 to Grutter,5 the Court has advanced a color-
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1. 539 u.s. 306 (2003). 
2. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327-30, 334 (holding that diversity is a compelling stale 
interest in an educational context, and upholding the Michigan law school affirmative 
action program as a narrowly tailored effort to promote diversity). Proponents of af-
firmative action were generally pleased with the Court's decision in Grutter. See, e.g., 
Steven Lubct, Affirmative Action Battle Has Just Begun, BALT. SUN, June 25, 2003, at 
15A ("Theodore M. Shaw, counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
likewise announced that the two opinions, taken together, constitute a strong endorse-
ment of the constitutionality of affirmative action. . .");see also Monica Davey, Diver-
sity Still Crucial Issue at Unil·ersity, Swdents Say, N.Y. Tl:VIES, June 24, 2003, at A26 
(" ... students declared the Supreme Court decisions a victory this afternoon."); Steven 
Greenhouse & Jonathan D. Glater, Companies See Law School Ruling as a Way to Help 
Keep the Diversity Pipeline Open, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A25 ("Businesses seek-
ing to achieve diversity can breathe a sigh of relict''); cf Neil A. Lewis, Some on the Right 
See a Challenge; Angry Groups Seeking a Justice Against Affirmative Action, N.Y. T!~IES, 
June 24, 2003, at A I ("The Supreme Court rulings on the University of Michigan admis-
sions policies set off a wave of consternation among conservative groups today."). 
3. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954) (invalidating separate-but-
equal public schools); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (requiring 
desegregation of public schools "with all deliberate speed") 
4. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 US. 265 (1978); see also id. at 287-
320 (opinion of Powell, J., stating that racial quotas were impermissible, but that race 
could be used as a "plus" factor in educational admissions). 
5. Gruuer, 539 U.S. at 322-24, 327-42 (2003) (upholding educational affirmative 
action program giving holistic and individualized consideration to applicants); but cf 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 US. 244, 247-71i (2003) (invalidating educational affirmative ac-
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blind conception of racial equality that treats race-conscious af-
firmative action as constitutionally suspect, because it deviates 
from an aspirational baseline of race neutrality that lies at the 
core of the equal protection clause. However, race neutrality is a 
hopelessly artificial concept in a Nation like ours, that continues 
to make race an operative factor in the allocation of nearly all 
significant societal resources. Rather, it is colorblind race neu-
trality that should be viewed as constitutionally suspect, because 
that is what now constitutes the culture's preferred form of racial 
discrimination. Contemporary "race neutrality" is simply a mod-
ern descendent of the more traditional forms of invidious dis-
crimination that have been practiced in the United States since 
the Nation was founded. And the Supreme Court's current pref-
erence for race-neutrality over race-consciousness is a modern 
descendent of the Court's own tradition of complicity in racial 
discrimination. 
Part II of this article describes the Supreme Court's current 
conception of racial discrimination, emphasizing the manner in 
which the Court has confused the concept of race neutrality with 
the concept of racial equality. Part III argues that the concept of 
race neutrality is constitutionally suspect, because it has now be-
come a tool for discriminating against racial minorities. Part IV 
argues that the only way in which we are ever likely to remedy 
the systemic discrimination that continues to permeate Ameri-
can culture is by pursuing the precise racial balance goals that 
the Supreme Court has deemed to be unconstitutional. Part V 
concludes that the Supreme Court is once again impeding the 
Nation's progress toward racial equality, as it has done so many 
times in the past. 
II. THE COURT'S CONCEPTION OF EQUALITY 
The Supreme Court views racial equality as if it were largely 
synonymous with race neutrality. As a result, the Court treats all 
racial classifications as constitutionally suspect, and subjects 
them to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause, 
whether they are invidious or benign.6 The Court's preference 
for prospective neutrality has the effect of invalidating most uses 
of race-conscious affirmative action, which in turn makes it diffi-
tinn program awarding specified number of points to minority applicants as too mechani-
cal to be narrowly tailored). 
6. See Grutter. 539 U.S. at 324-26; Adarand Constructors v. Pcna, 515 U.S. 200, 
223-27 (1995). 
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cult to eliminate the existing inequalities that have been pro-
duced by centuries of prior discrimination. 7 
A. RACE NEUTRALITY 
The Supreme Court's fondness for race neutrality is trace-
able to Brown v. Board of Education. 8 Brown invalidated the 
race-conscious, separate-but-equal regime of Plessy v. Ferguson,9 
holding that, in our racially stratified society, separate was "in-
herently unequal." 10 Brown, therefore, treated race-conscious 
governmental classifications as intrinsically objectionable, even 
if race was used in ways that were hypothetically "equal." But 
Brown also generated a logical dilemma. The Nation's long his-
tory of official discrimination left a legacy of existing inequalities 
that could not be remedied merely through the use of prospec-
tive race neutrality. Indeed, the ingrained and often unconscious 
racial attitudes that caused Brown to characterize racial seg-
regation as inherently unequal meant that racial minorities could 
never make up for the considerable head start that whites had 
given themselves in the race for economic, political and social 
resources- unless whites were forced to slow down long enough 
for racial minorities to catch up. Therefore, the race-neutral so-
ciety that Brown envisioned could come into existence only 
through use of the race-conscious means that Brown found ob-
jectionable. Brown and its progeny ultimately sought to resolve 
this dilemma by permitting the use of race-conscious measures 
only where necessary to remedy past or present constitutional 
violations. 11 However, Brown was unclear about precisely why 
race consciousness offended the Constitution. 12 
7. Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion in Gratz contains statistics illustrating ex· 
isting racial inequalities in the distribution of societal resources. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 
53Y U.S. 244, 301-03 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
8. 347 U.S. 483, 4Y3-Y6 (1 Y54) (invalidating separate-but-equal public schools). 
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
10. See Brown v. Bd. of Ed11c., 347 U.S. 483, 4Y5 (IY54) ("Separate educational fa-
cilities arc inherently unequal."). 
11. See Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 16 (1971) (limit-
ing scope of federal court remedial power to redress of constitutional violations); cf. 
North Carolina Stale Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43,45-46 (IY71) (invalidating pro-
hibition on race-conscious pupil assignment designed to advance racial balance as incon-
sistent with remedial requirements of Brown). 
12. Brown might have been motivated by a number of things, including the desire 
to reduce racial stigmatization; the desire to equalize intangible factors in the educational 
process; or the desire lo protect associational rights. See generally GEOFFREY STONE ET 
AL., CONST!TCT!ONAL LAW 448-53 (4th ed. 2001 ). 
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The Court's reason for treating race consciousness as consti-
tutionally suspect was fleshed out by Justice Powell's opinicn in 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. 13 Bakke stressed 
that the problem with racial classifications was that they stereo-
typed people as members of particular racial groups, rather than 
treating people as individuals. 14 Moreover, because that was true 
of all racial classifications- whether invidious or benign- all ra-
cial classification should be subject to strict scrutiny under the 
equal protection clause. 15 Affirmative action programs could not 
therefore use "racial quotas" to achieve "racial balance," be-
cause that would subordinate individual characteristics to group 
membership in a way that violated the tenets of liberalism on 
which the equal protection clause rested. 16 Once again, however, 
the Court's understanding of racial discrimination simply re-
posed the Brown dilemma. Because someone's race is an impor-
tant component of his or her individual identity, individualized 
consideration must necessarily entail some degree of race-
conscious consideration. Justice Powell sought to resolve the di-
lemma by permitting the use of race as a "plus" factor in what 
was otherwise an individualized assessment of merit. But that 
could only be done as part of a program that was narrowly tai-
lored to advance a compelling state interest, thereby satisfying 
the demands of strict scrutiny. 17 Although the Bakke "holding" 
consisted largely of the views of Justice Powell, a five-Justice 
majority of the Supreme Court endorsed those views in Grutter 
v. Bollinger. 18 
Grutter reaffirmed the conclusion that strict scrutiny applied 
to benign as well as invidious racial classifications, 19 but for the 
first time since its infamous decision in Korematsu v. United 
St~tes,20 the Supre~e Cou~t u~held a racial clas~ification after 
stnct equal protectiOn scrutmy.- The Grutter holdmg was largely 
13. 438 U.S. 265,269 (1978) (Powell, J.). 
14. /d. at 298-3lXJ, 315 (Powell, J.); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. 332-33; Richmond v. 
Croson, 488 U.S. 469,493-94 (1989) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.). 
15. Bakke relied on Brown in rejecting the claim that benign racial classifications 
disadvantaging the white majority should be judged more permissively than invidious 
classifications disadvantaging racial minorities. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 293-99 (opinion of 
Powell, J.). 
16. !d. at289, 307, 315 (Powell, J.); see also Gruuer, 539 U.S. at329-30. 
17. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-19 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
18. See Gructer, 539 U.S. at 326-29, 332-36. 
19. See id. at 324-29. 
20. 323 u.s. 214 (1944). 
21. See Gruuer, 539 U.S. at 344-45. This was also the first time that Justice 
O'Connor had ever voted to uphold a racial affirmative action program. See 
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unexpected, because several lower courts had invalidated similar 
affirmative action programs,22 and because the Court's 1995 de-
cision in Adarand Constructors v. Pena,23 made it look as if strict 
scrutiny would be fatal for affirmative action. Although the Ada-
rand Court expressly held open the possibility that some affirma-
tive action programs might be adequate to survive strict scru-
tiny,24 the program at issue in Adarand itself was so mild, that 
the Court's assurance appeared more rhetorical than real.25 Jus-
tice O'Connor's majority opinion in Adarand also implied that 
racial affirmative action would be constitutionally impermissible 
if race-neutral alternatives had not first been proved inade-
quate,26 but her majority opinion in Grutter curiously held that 
the Constitution did not require all race-neutral alternatives to 
be exhausted.27 Nevertheless, Grutter continued the Supreme 
Court preference for race-neutral over race-conscious classifica-
tions, by subjecting only race-conscious classifications to strict 
scrutiny.28 
Grutter reaffirmed the Bakke view that diversity could con-
stitute a compelling state interest in an educational context/9 but 
YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 159-63 (2000) (dis-
cussing Supreme Court voting blocs on issue of racial affirmative action). 
22. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 
1033 (1996) (invalidating diversity-based affirmative action program for University of 
Texas student admissions); see also Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234 (2001) (in-
validating diversity-based affirmative action program for University of Georgia); 
Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 
529 U.S. 1019 (2000) (invalidating diversity-based affirmative action program for Mont-
gomery County, Maryland magnet school); Tuttle v. Arlington County, 195 F.3d 698 (4th 
Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1050 (2000) (invalidating diversity based affirmative 
action program for Arlington, Virginia public schools); Wesmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 
(1st Cir. 1998) (invalidating diversity-based affirmative action program for Boston Latin 
School); Taxman v. Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en 
bane), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997), cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997) (invalidat-
ing diversity-based affirmative action program for New Jersey high school teacher lay-
offs); Podberesky v. Kirwin, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995) 
(invalidating University of Maryland minority college scholarship program); but see 
Smith v. University of Washington Law School, 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. de-
nied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001) (dismissing as moot prospective challenge to diversity-based-
affirmative action program for University of Washington Law School, and holding that 
student diversity did constitute compelling state interest). 
23. 515 u.s. 200 (1995) 
24. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (strict scrutiny is not necessarily fatal scrutiny). 
25. What the Court found constitutionally suspect was simply a rebuttable pre-
sumption that racial minorities were socially and economically disadvantaged-
somcthmg that would seem to be beyond dispute. See id. at 205-10 (describing pre-
sumptiOn). 
26. See id. at237-38; see also Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,507 (1989). 
27. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339-40. 
28. See id. at 326. 
29. See id. at 323, 328-30. 
226 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:221 
it also strongly endorsed Bakke's distaste for racial quotas. In 
upholding the racial affirmative action program used by the 
University of Michigan law school, the Grutter Court went to 
great pains to stress that the program was valid because it merely 
used race as a "plus" factor in "a highly individualized, holistic 
review of each applicant's file,"30 and did not entail the use of ra-
cial quotas that "would amount to outright racial balancing, 
which is patently unconstitutional."31 The Court hammered the 
point home on the same day by invalidating, in Gratz v. Bollin-
ger,32 the separate racial affirmative action program used by the 
University of Michigan undergraduate college. It found that the 
undergraduate program's automatic award of a fixed number of 
points to minority applicants denied "individualized consid-
eration" to each applicant, and had "the effect of making 'the 
factor of race ... decisive' for virtually every minimally qualified 
underrepresented minority applicant. "33 Although it is likely that 
future affirmative action programs will now be structured to 
emulate the program upheld in Grutter, the Court's insistence on 
holistic consideration of admissions files may increase the ad-
ministrative burden imposed on admissions offices enough to re-
duce the amount of affirmative action that schools can afford to 
undertake. 
The precedential value of Grutter is uncertain for at least 
two reasons. First, the case may or may not be limited to the 
educational context in which it was decided. Justice Scalia's con-
trary suggestion notwithstanding,34 diversity may not be recog-
nized as compelling in other contexts such as employment, 
where the goal is productivity rather than the exchange of intel-
lectual ideas and perspectives. Second, because Justice 
O'Connor has become the swing vote on the issue of affirmative 
action, the precedential value of Grutter may be limited by both 
30. /d. at 337. 
31. /d. at 330. Like Justice Powell in Bakke, see 438 U.S. 265, 316-19 (1978), Justice 
O'Connor's majority opinion in Grwter paid homage to the Harvard affirmative action 
plan as a model of holistic, individualized consideration that did not make use of racial 
quotas. See Gruuer, 539 U.S. at 335-37. The deference shown to Harvard is ironic, in light 
of Harvard's history of using quotas to limit the admission of Jews. See id. at 369 (Tho-
mas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
32. 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (invalidating racial affirmative action program at University 
of Michigan undergraduate College of Literature, Science and Arts). 
33. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72, quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265,317 (1978) (Powell, J.) (ellipsis in original). 
34. See Gruuer, 539 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that diversity jus-
tification endorsed by majority could be used to justify affirmative action in public and 
private employment). 
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her personal policy preferences and her tenure on the Court. If a 
more conservative Justice were to replace Justice O'Connor, 
Grutter might be narrowly interpreted or even overruled. If the 
case were narrowly interpreted, Justice Kennedy's position in 
Grutter might become controlling, and the law of affirmative ac-
tion could once again revert to its post-Adarand status. Affirma-
tive action would remain theoretically permissible, but in actual-
ity, no program would likely be found to survive strict scrutiny.35 
However, it may also be true that considerations of efficiency 
and collegiality will make the Court reluctant to revisit the racial 
affirmative action issue in the immediate future. Despite politi-
cal changes on the Court, it took 19 years for Planned Par-
enthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casei6 to supplant Roe 
v. Wade37 with resiJect to the issue of abortion, and 17 years for 
Lawrence v. Texas38 to overrule Bowers v. Hardwick39 with re-
spect to the issue of homosexual sodomy.40 Perhaps Grutter will 
remain the law through inertia for a similar period of time. 
Prior to Grutter and Gratz, the Supreme Court politics of af-
firmative action was fairly simple to ascertain. A five Justice 
conservative bloc-consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas-virtually al-
ways voted against affirmative action. A four-Justice liberal 
bloc-consisting of Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and 
Breyer-virtually always voted in favor of affirmative action. 41 
In the wake of Grutter and Gratz, things have become a bit more 
complicated. Justice O'Connor voted with the liberal bloc to up-
hold the affirmative action plan in Grutter, 5-4,42 and Justices 
O'Connor and Breyer voted with the conservative bloc to invali-
date the affirmative action plan in Gratz, 6-3.43 There now seem 
to be seven votes to reject the proposition advanced by the Fifth 
35. Like Justice O'Connor prior to Cruller, Justice Kennedy has never voted to up-
hold a racial affirmative action program. This is also true of Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
and with one exception, of Chief Justice Rehnquist. See SPANN, supra note 21, at 159-63 
(discussing Supreme Court voting blocs on issue of racial affirmative action). 
36. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
38. 539 u.s. 558 (2003) 
39. 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
40. I owe this insight to a commc:nt made by my colleague Professor Mark Tushnet 
at a Georgetown University Law Center Supreme Court Institute program on Cruller 
and Gratz in the summer of 2003. 
41. See SPA:-.!N, supra note 21, at 159-63 (discussing Supreme Court voting blocs on 
issue of racial affirmative action). 
42. See Cruller, 539 U.S. at310 (majority opinion of O'Connor, J.). 
43. See Gratz, 539 U.S at 247, 276 (O'Connor, J., joining majority opinion and con-
curnng); id. at 281-82 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas,44 that race can never be used in an 
affirmative action plan, even to advance educational diversity. 
Because only Justices Scalia and Thomas would now support 
such an approach,45 some form of racial affirmative action is 
likely to remain at least theoretically constitutional. 
The diversity reasoning of Grutter could also undermine 
other lower court decisions. For example, Grutter might now au-
thorize the use of minority scholarships, such as those invali-
dated by the Fourth Circuit in Podberesky v. Kirwin,46 as a 
means of getting minority students actually to attend the schools 
that admitted them in the hope of increasing diversity. Similarly, 
Grutter might now authorize the use of race-conscious teacher 
layoffs, such as those invalidated in Taxman v. Piscataway 
Township Board of Education,47 as a means of promoting faculty 
diversity in the exchange of ideas to which students are exposed. 
Grutter might even authorize efforts to increase diversity in the 
pool of doctors or lawyers available to serve minority communi-
ties, even though such an interest was expressly rejected as not 
compelling by Justice Powell in Bakke.48 On the present Court, it 
44. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996), cere. denied, 518 U.S. 
1033 (1996) (" ... any consideration of race or cthnicity by the law school for the purpose 
of achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth 
Amendment."). 
45. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
("'The Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race, and stale· 
provided education is no exception."); id. at 350 (Thomas. J., concurring in part and dis· 
senting in part) ("Similarly, a university may not maintain a high admission standard and 
grant exemptions to favored races."); id. at 371 (" ... the majority still cannot commit to 
the principle that racial classifications arc per se harmful and that almost no amount of 
benefit in the eye of the beholder can justify such classifications.") (emphasis in original). 
46. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cere. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995) (invalidating mi-
nority college student scholarship program). Note that Grutter's insistence on ensuring 
that all students be able to compete for all scats may be read to preclude the usc of mi-
nority scholarships. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (a program cannot insulate one category 
of applicants from competition with all other applicants). 
47. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en bane), cere. granted, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997), cere. 
dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997) (invalidating diversity-based affirmative action program 
for high school teacher layoffs). Note that Justice O'Connor has previously voted against 
race-conscious teacher layoffs, but she has declined to rule them out in all cases. See Wy-
gant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,293-94 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
48. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310·11 (1978) (opinion 
of Powell, J., stating that any compelling interest in increasing health care to minority 
communities can be advanced through race-neutral means). To the extent that the qual-
ity of professional services for a diverse population can be improved by increasing the 
diversity of the professionals who provide those services, Grutter might make this interest 
compelling. Cf Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that diversity 
justification endorsed by majority could be used to justify affirmative action in public and 
private employment). 
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appears as if Justice O'Connor will have the decisive vote in de-
termining how such policy issues will be resolved. 
B. SOCIETAL DISCRIMINATION 
Liberal celebrations notwithstanding, Justice O'Connor's 
majority opinion in Grutter seems likely to prolong rather than 
ameliorate the problem of racial discrimination. It holds that af-
firmative action programs must be narrowly tailored in order to 
survive strict scrutiny,49 but it defines narrow tailoring to mean 
non-responsiveness to the continuing problem of systemic dis-
crimination. Consistent with Bakke's assertion that racial classi-
fications are unconstitutional because they treat people as mem-
bers of a group rather than as individuals, Grutter views racial 
discrimination as something that is particularized rather than 
pervasive in nature. 5° Accordingly, it reaffirms prior cases assert-
ing that affirmative action cannot constitutionally be used to 
remedy general "societal discrimination. "51 This, in turn, allows 
the Court to treat the concept of racial equality as if it were 
largely synonymous with the concept of prospective race neutral-
ity. As long as the continuing effects of prior discrimination can 
be disregarded by denominating them "societal," formal equality 
can be achieved merely by insisting on prospective colorblind-
ness. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that the goal of 
reducing systemic or "societal discrimination" is a constitution-
ally impermissible goal for race-conscious affirmative action. 
The Court believes that the pursuit of such a goal would author-
ize affirmative action programs that were too vast, and too bur-
densome on innocent whites.52 Moreover, it would permit the 
state to utilize quotas to achieve racial balance in a way that was 
inconsistent with the race-neutrality foundations of Brown. 
Therefore, the Court has historically limited race-conscious af-
firmative action to narrowly tailored remedies for particularized 
acts of past discrimination that were supported by reliable legis-
49. See Gruuer, 539 U.S. at 333-34 (requiring narrow tailoring, and upholding 
Michigan law school affirmative action program as a narrowly tailored effort to promote 
diversity). 
50. See id. at 324, 326 (equal protection clause protects personal rights rather than 
group rights). 
51. See id. at 323-24, 328 (rejecting remedies for "societal discrimination" and 
remedies designed to promote racial balance). 
52. See id. at 323-24, citing Bakke, 438 US at 310 (Powell, J.). 
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lative, judicial or administrative findings. 53 Although Grutter has 
now authorized the use of affirmative action to promote diver-
sity, it has nevertheless reaffirmed the traditional prohibition on 
using affirmative action to remedy general societal discrimina-
tion.)4 
By ruling race-conscious remedies for societal discrimina-
tion out of bounds, the Supreme Court has enabled itself largely 
to sidestep the dilemma posed by Brown and Bakke. The 
Court's reconceptualization of "racial equality" as something 
that can exist despite the continued systemic effects of past dis-
crimination avoids most needs to authorize the use of race-
conscious remedies in the pursuit of equality. Prospective race 
neutrality typically becomes adequate to satisfy whatever de-
mands the equal protection clause imposes, because the ine-
qualities that cannot be eliminated through race-neutral means 
typically do not count for equal protection purposes. That sort of 
reconceptualization is precisely what the Court used to deal with 
the problem of Northern school desegregation in the post-Brown 
era. Not wanting to force suburban white children to go to 
school with inner-city black or Latino children, the Supreme 
Court simply defined one-race minority schools to be "desegre-
gated" despite the fact that their racially identifiable character 
had not changed.55 Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion in 
53. This position was articulated by Justice Powell in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10 
(Powell, J.), and reasserted by Justice Powell in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 
267, 274-79 (1986) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.). Lead by Justice O'Connor, this view 
has now been adopted by a majority of the full Supreme Court. See Cruller, 539 U.S. at 
323-24 (majority opinion of O'Connor, J., citing Bakke as rejecting interest in remedying 
societal discrimination); id. at 330 (rejecting racial balancing as "patently unconstitu-
tional"); see also Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 496-98 (plurality opinion of 
O'Connor, J., rejecting societal discrimination); Metro Broad. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 
610-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (rejecting societal discrimination); Wygam, 476 U.S. at 
288 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (rejecting societal discrimination); Johnson v. Transp. 
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647-53 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (reject-
ing societal discrimination). 
54. See Cruller, 539 U.S. at 323-24, 328. 
55. Because of de facto residential segregation, inner-city school students arc often 
predominantly minority while students in surrounding suburbs arc often predominantly 
white. Meaningful desegregation of these schools would, therefore, require busing be-
tween inner-city and suburban schools. However, the Supreme Court held in Milliken v. 
Bradley (/), 418 U.S. 717, 737-47 (1974), that interdistrict busing was prohibited in the 
absence of an interdistrict constitutional violation-something that did not typically exist 
in the suburbs, where there were too few minority students to warrant segregation. Then, 
in Milliken v. Bradley (If), 433 U.S. 267, 279-88 (1977), the Court implied that the rem-
edy for unconstitutionally segregated inner-city schools could consist of mere remedial 
education programs. Finally, in Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. 
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,249-50 (1991), the Court stated that a school district could become 
"unitary," once the district "had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree" 
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Gratz offers a striking statistical demonstration of the ways in 
which societal discrimination continues to make racial minorities 
an identifiable underclass in American culture.56 But the Su-
preme Court has now chosen simply to define racial equality as 
something that takes no cognizance of those inequalities. Grut-
ter's recognition of a constitutionally legitimate interest in educa-
tional diversity may superficially seem to be an exception to this 
characterization.57 However, I believe that after more careful 
scrutiny, Grutter is better understood as having little to do with 
the interests of racial minorities. 
III. RACE-NEUTRAL DISCRIMINATION 
The Supreme Court's preference for race neutrality, rooted 
in its reluctance to confront the continuing problem of systemic 
societal discrimination, turns out to be a fairly effective way of 
engaging in racial discrimination. By reading the Constitution to 
preserve the racial status quo in the allocation of significant so-
cietal resources, the Nation's white majority is able to continue 
discounting the interests of racial minorities in ways that are too 
passive to be immediately recognized as oppressive. Even Grut-
ter is discriminatory in this sense, because it authorizes only 
marginal increases in racial diversity while prohibiting more 
meaningful systemic change. Interestingly, Justice Thomas iden-
tifies and exposes this aspect of the majority opinion, but he re-
mains unwilling to endorse systemic remedies himself. 
and "the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable.'" 
The Milliken and Dowell cases, therefore, allow previously segregated inner-city ("dual") 
schools to become "desegregated" ("unitary") schools without any change in their racial 
composition. They also effectively rc-constitutionalized the separate-but-equal status of 
public schools that Brown had formally declared unconstitutional. Because the Supr..:me 
Court has never expressly stated that a school system can be both segregated and unitary, 
it is possible to read the Milliken and Dowell cases as standing for the alternate proposi-
tion that racially segregated school systems remain dual because of their racially identifi-
able character, but that the Constitution simply docs not permit them ever to be made 
unitary because of the constraints imposed by Milliken I. Whatever theoretical founda-
tion such a reading might have, as a practical matter, it still permits the maintenance of 
segregated schools. 
56. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 299-304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
57. Indeed, it is not clear why promoting the educational diversity that Cruller rec-
ognizes as a compelling governmental interest is not itself a remedy for the "societal dis-
crimination" that Cruller finds to be beyond the reach of race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion. To the extent that the lack of diversity in elite educational institutions is caused bv 
the societal discrimination embedded in admission standards, it is possible to read Grui-
ter as retreating from the Court's previous ban on the usc of race-conscious affirmative 
action to remedy societal discrimination. 
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A. PASSIVE OPPRESSION 
The United States has a long tradition of invidious discrimi-
nation against racial minorities, and an equally long tradition of 
insisting on both the de jure and the de facto relevance of race in 
nearly all aspects of American life. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the culture's new-found affinity for prospective race neutral-
ity in the post-Brown era comes at a time when racial minorities 
have begun to make economic, political and social gains through 
the use of race-conscious affirmative action. By arresting those 
gains, current demands for race neutrality are simply the modern 
incarnation of the same invidious discrimination that the culture 
has used to oppress racial minorities in the past. It seems more 
than a mere coincidence that contemporary voter initiative pro-
posals requiring race neutrality, and even prohibiting the collec-
tion of statistical data in racial categories, have been sponsored 
by political conservatives (who have historically opposed racial 
minority rights) rather than by political liberals (who have his-
torically favored minority rights ).58 
Similarly, the Supreme Court's refusal to allow even majori-
tarian political remedies for societal discrimination, fits com-
fortably within a long tradition of Supreme Court impediments 
to the advancement of racial equality. It is reminiscent of earlier 
Supreme Court decisions uJ'holding the appropriation of Indian 
lands,59 upholding slavery,6 upholding official segregation,61 up-
holding the exclusion of Japanese-American citizens from their 
58. Ballot initiatives prohibiting government consideration of race in educational 
admissions, hiring and contracting have been enacted in California (Proposition 209) and 
Washington (Initiative 200). Governor Jeb Bush of Florida has issued an executive order 
prohibiting the consideration of race in state university admissions. See Erik Lords, Tak-
ing Sides, BLACK ISSt..:ES I:" HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 27, 2(XJ3, at 26. A proposed initiative 
(Proposition 54) in California that would have prohibited the collection of most demo-
graphic data by race, was defeated in the October 7, 2003 recall election in which Arnold 
Schwarzcnegger replaced Gray Davis as Governor of California. See Rebecca Trounson 
& Nancy Vogel, Total Recall: Proposirions 53 and 54; Borh Ballor Meamres Go Down in 
Defear, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, at A26. These proposals have been sponsored or sup-
ported by Ward Conncrly, the black conservative regent of the University of California 
who spearheaded the adoption of California Proposition 209. See id.; Katherine Cor-
coran, Supporl Narrows For Racial Iniriarive; Imeresr Grows Among Larinos, Field Poll 
Finds, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 19,2003, at 13. 
59. See Johnson v. Mcintosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (European discovery of 
land now constituting United States, and conquest of indigenous Indian inhabitants, di-
vested Indians of title to that land). 
60. See Dred Scull v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (invalidating congres-
sional statute prohibiting slavery in Louisiana Territory). 
61. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding separate-but-equal racial 
segregation). 
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homes,62 and upholding de facto racial segregation.63 Viewed 
against this backdrop, the Supreme Court's insistence on de-
fining narrow tailoring to preclude remedies for societal dis-
crimination is more than just curious.64 The Court's position is it-
self constitutionally suspect, because it seems to be motivated by 
a desire to ensure that racial minorities continue to occupy their 
traditional social status as subordinate to whites. Despite the 
lofty rhetoric that is typically used to advocate it, there is nothing 
noble about contemporary race neutrality. 
The thing that animates the Supreme Court's conception of 
racial discrimination is a belief that it should be understood as a 
particularized phenomenon that is unrelated to the statistically 
disproportionate hardships suffered by racial minorities as a 
group. However, the most oppressive forms of contemporary 
discrimination are systemic in nature. They are revealed by ra-
cially-correlated statistical disparities, and not by pairing indi-
vidual discriminators with individual victims. The reason that ra-
cial minorities occupy a perpetual underclass in the United 
States is that they are statistically underrepresented in the allo-
cation of societal resources. 65 And that remains true even though 
the Supreme Court finds it difficult to identify a particularized 
cause of that pervasive underrepresentation.66 
The serious conceptual difficulty encountered in trying to 
distinguish between particularized discrimination and societal 
discrimination is illustrated by the Supreme Court's recent foray 
into race-conscious redistricting. The Court has held that the 
"predominant" consideration of race in drawing voting district 
lines offends the equal protection clause of the Constitution, be-
cause it violates the individual rights of voters who are placed in 
62. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding World War II 
military exclusion order directed at Japanese-American citizens). 
63. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189,208-09 (1973) (adopting cxpansivc in-
terpretation of dc jurc segregation, but reaffirming prohibition on usc of race-conscious 
remedies to eliminate de facto segregation); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Edue., 
402 U.S. I, 17-18 (1971) (same); cf, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S 229,238-48 (1976) (read-
ing equal protection clause to permit racially disparate impact not directly caused by inten-
tional discrimination). 
64. See Cruller v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323-24, 328, 334 (2003) (rejecting societal 
discrimination and usc of racial quotas to achieve racial balance). 
65. Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion in Gratz contains statistics illustrating ex-
isting racial inequalities in the distribution of societal resources. See Gratz v. Bollinger. 
539 U.S. 244, 301-03 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
66. See, e.g., Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,498-508 (1989) (despite stark statis-
tical disparities, record was insufficient to reveal any past racial discrimination in Rich-
mond, Virginia construction trades). 
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particular districts because of their race.67 But as Justice Gins-
burg has pointed out, redistricting is an activity that is almost al-
ways based on the statistical presence of various groups in vari-
ous districts. Redistricting has no bearing whatsoever on 
individual rights.68 In that sense, societal discrimination is like 
redistricting. It is solely about the statistical representation of 
various groups in the allocation of resources. It has nothing 
whatsoever to do with the individual rights that the Supreme 
Court claims to be protecting as it perpetuates societal discrimi-
nation.69 
Here is a way to appreciate the racial discrimination that is 
entailed in the Supreme Court's refusal to allow remedies for so-
cietal discrimination. It seems reasonably clear that most whites 
would not want to trade places with blacks. Indeed, one study 
found that white college students would want $1 million per year 
in damages if they were suddenly to be made black rather than 
white. 70 The reason for this is presumably because of the non-
particularized societal discrimination that continues to exist 
against blacks in American culture. The Supreme Court not only 
refuses to recognize such discrimination as something for which 
the Constitution provides a remedy, but it actually reads the 
equal protection clause as prohibiting affirmative action reme-
dies for such discrimination. However, the Court does read the 
Constitution to prohibit discrimination against whites who are 
burdened by affirmative action programs. And it does so even 
though any discrimination against whites is equally non-
particularized. 
It is just as hard to tell which individual white is harmed by 
affirmative action as it is to tell which individual black is harmed 
by the societal discrimination that gives rise to the need for af-
67. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916-17 (1995) (articulating "predominant 
factor" test). 
68. See id. at 946-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, arguing that redistricting has no bear-
ing on individual rights). 
69. This lies at the core of a longstanding debate concerning individual and group 
rights under the equal protection clauses. Compare Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of 
the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 48-52 (1976) (arguing that dis-
crimination, and consequently discrimination remedies, should be viewed as individual 
phenomena) and Michael J. Perry, The Principle of Equal Protection, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 
1133, 1145-48 (1981) (same), with Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection 
Clause, 5 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 147-77 (1976) (arguing that discrimination, and con-
sequently discrimination remedies, should be viewed as group phenomena). 
70. See ANDREW HACKER, TwO NATIONS 32 (1992) (describing study); see also 
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1759 (1993) (discussing 
study described by Hacker). 
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firmative action. The abolition of affirmative action might in-
crease the number of whites admitted to a particular program, 
but no particular white can know whether he or she would have 
been the one admitted. Many whites with similar credentials will 
inevitably be competing for the few additional slots that are 
freed up by the abolition of affirmative action, and some of those 
whites will inevitably be displaced by the better qualified blacks 
who are no longer admitted to more prestigious programs be-
cause of the demise of affirmative action. 71 Similarly, the aboli-
tion of general societal discrimination might increase the number 
of blacks admitted to a particular program, but no particular 
black can know whether he or she would have been the one ad-
mitted. Because of the many imponderables involved, counter-
factual futures simply cannot be predicted with the degree of 
precision that would be required to turn systemic racial discrimi-
nation into particularized racial discrimination. That is true 
whether the systemic discrimination is caused by affirmative ac-
tion or by general societal discrimination. 
However, even if one insists on ignoring systemic discrimi-
nation and characterizing unconstitutional racial discrimination 
as the violation of an individual right- as the Supreme Court in-
sists on doing72 - that characterization is equally applicable to 
both affirmative action and societal discrimination. To the extent 
that the burdens of affirmative action can be personified by the 
harm to one individual white who might have been admitted to a 
program in the absence of affirmative action, the burdens of so-
cietal discrimination can be personified by the harm to one indi-
vidual black who might have been admitted to a program in the 
absence of societal discrimination. The only difference is the 
race of the groups (or individuals) that the Supreme Court de-
cides to protect or abandon. If the victims are white, the Su-
preme Court will protect them by invalidating the offending af-
firmative action program. But if the victims are black, the 
71. Where there arc both a large number of applicants for a limited number of 
spaces and a large number of white applicants relative to the number of minority appli-
cants, affirmative action will significantly increase the probability that particular minority 
applicants will be admitted to a program. However, the abolition of affirmative action 
will not significantly increase the probability that particular white applicants will be ad-
mitted to the program. See Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic 
Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1045-50 (2002). Perhaps this 
is the ultimate point of Justice Stevens' objection to the plaintiffs' standing to challenge 
the affirmative actiOn program at Issue In Gratz. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 266, 
283-88 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
72. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324, 326 (2003) (equal protection clause 
protects personal rights rather than group rights). 
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Supreme Court will abandon them and disregard the offending 
societal discrimination. As it has done so often in the past, the 
Supreme Court is simply favoring the interests of whites over the 
interests of racial minorities. In a culture replete with invidious 
societal discrimination against racial minorities, the Supreme 
Court has focused its attention on the more marginal burdens 
that affirmative action imposes on whites. That is called racial 
discrimination. 
B. JUSTICE THOMAS 
Justice Thomas recognizes that the Grutter majority is ig-
noring the systemic nature of contemporary discrimination, and 
is providing only incidental benefits to racial minorities. In fact, 
his Grutter dissent contains the seeds of a fairly radical theory of 
social change. But his curious commitment to a race-neutral con-
ception of equality ultimately causes him to favor the denial of 
all race-conscious remedies over the provision of remedies that 
are more comprehensive. 
Justice Thomas calls Grutter's concern with diversity merely 
"aesthetic," because it makes the student bodies at elite institu-
tions look more colorful, without measurably improving the so-
cial circumstances of underprivileged minorities.73 In arguing 
that this aesthetic concern does not amount to a compelling state 
interest, Thomas claims that the Court's real interest is in pro-
tecting elitism. If elitism were not a concern, a school could in-
cre:lse its diversity in race-neutral ways simply by modifying its 
admissions standards to accept all qualified students; by aban-
doning practices that disproportionately disadvantage minorities, 
such as legacy preferences; or by discontinuing the use of racially 
skewed standardized tests, such as the LSAT.74 Thomas also 
suggests that racial minority interests are being sacrificed in or-
der to promote diversity at elite institutions, arguing that blacks 
learn better in historically black schools; that affirmative action 
beneficiaries do not learn as much as students who are admitted 
without preferences; and that minority beneficiaries are stigma-
tized by affirmative action. 75 
Justice Thomas recognizes that the underrepresentation of 
racial minorities in the allocation of societal resources is the 
product of established cultural practices that collectively consti-
73. See id. at 354-55 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
74. See id. at355-61, 367-71. 
75. See id. at364-66, 371-74. 
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tute societal discrimination. He also recognizes that minority in-
terests are commonly sacrificed in order to preserve that societal 
discrimination. Moreover, his elitism argument gains increased 
plausibility when one recalls that the Court was willing to uphold 
an affirmative action plan for the Michigan law school in Gruffer, 
but was not willing to uphold a similar plan for construction 
workers in Adarand.76 
The radical feature of Justice Thomas's position is his stated 
willingness to abandon the cultural practices that perpetuate the 
continued existence of societal discrimination. For him, that 
would be a race-neutral way of solving the problem of systemic 
discrimination. The problem with that solution, however, is that 
the society at large is almost certainly unwilling to abandon 
those cultural practices. The practices are so deeply ingrained 
that they seem inevitable rather than optional. Although we 
have known about the discriminatory implications of traditional 
admissions standards, legacies, and LSA T scores for decades, we 
remain noticeably reluctant to abandon them. However, for 
some reason, we are willing to carve out occasional affirmative 
action exceptions to those cultural practices for racial minorities. 
But Justice Thomas would invalidate all such exceptions on the 
grounds that they are race conscious, even though he would en-
dorse the more radical step of abandoning those cultural prac-
tices completely. 
Justice Thomas's commitment to race neutrality seems logi-
cally to be rooted in either the belief that the status quo is race 
neutral; the belief that prospective race neutrality will eventually 
eliminate any racial inequities that exist in the current allocation 
of resources; or the belief that existing inequities are preferable 
to the negative consequences of affirmative action. However, 
none of those positions is tenable. 
Far from being race neutral, the status quo has been racially 
skewed by a long history of discrimination. This is illustrated by 
the continued existence of the very cultural practices that Justice 
Thomas himself identifies as discriminatory. 
The notion that prospective neutrality could eventually en-
able racial minorities to overcome the disadvantages imposed by 
76. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Note, however, that this 
argument can also cut the other way. To the extent that the Supreme Court is motivated 
hy the desire to protect whites who arc harmed hy affirmative action, the Court was more 
willing to protect the less-elite white construction workers in Adarand than the more-
elite white law school applicants in Grwter. 
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a history of discrimination seems extremely counterintuitive. 
Minorities could overcome the enormous head start that has 
been given to whites only if minorities were more qualified than 
whites to satisfy the standards built into those cultural prac-
tices-standards that favor whites over minorities. And no one 
seems to believe that racial minorities are more qualified than 
whites. 
The argument that affirmative action will ultimately harm 
racial minorities by stigmatizing them and ~roducing other col-
lateral harms has more facial plausibility. 7 Empirical studies 
suggest that even when the benefits of affirmative action out-
weigh the attendant harms, the harms themselves remain signifi-
cant. 78 And I argue in the present article that the limited affirma-
tive action authorized by Grutter is likely to have only marginal 
benefits for racial minorities.79 Nevertheless, the argument that 
racial affirmative action is unconstitutional because it harms its 
intended beneficiaries is not an argument that I am able to take 
seriously. It seems reasonably clear that the benefits of real af-
firmative action- affirmative action that successfully addressed 
the problem of existing "societal discrimination"- would greatly 
outweigh any increase in the stigmatization harms that racial mi-
norities are already forced to endure. One is better off having re-
sources than being thought well of while continuing to languish 
in a perpetual underclass. But even if it were a closer question, 
an institution with the racial history of the Supreme Court80 
lacks the moral authority to tell racial minorities what is in their 
own best interest. If Justice Thomas's anxieties about affirmative 
action were shared by racial minorities in general, those anxie-
ties would merit more careful consideration. However, when 
they echo the views of the very white majority whose privileged 
status would be reduced by affirmative action, those anxieties 
seem as disingenuous as they do paternalistic. One cannot help 
but recall that slavery used to be defended by its white support-
ers on the grounds that the institution of slavery was good for 
77. See supra text accompanying note 75 (Justice Thomas asserting that affirmative 
action has negative consequences for racial minorities). 
78. See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 12, at 593-94 (discussing empirical research, 
including Linda Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations after Affirmative 
Acrion, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251 (1998)). 
79. See supra introductory paragraph for Part III. 
80. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64 (discussing cases in which Supreme 
Court has promoted racial inequality). 
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blacks, because it elevated blacks from their natural savage 
state.81 
If Justice Thomas comes to recognize his conception of race 
neutrality as unrealistic, he may be willing to endorse more 
meaningful race-conscious remedies. As some commentators 
have suggested, Justice Thomas may simply be acting out a 
deep-seated psychological resentment of liberals who never took 
his accomplishments seriously, by opposing the very affirmative 
action programs from which he himself benefited.82 But he 
seems not yet to have realized that it is also possible to punish 
liberals from the left, and not only from the right. 
IV. RACE-CONSCIOUS EQUALITY 
Only vigorous efforts to redistribute societal resources in 
ways that are unapologetically race-conscious are likely to make 
any qualitative change in the systemic discrimination that con-
tinues to characterize American culture. But Grutter's treatment 
of such racial-balance remedies as inconsistent with a liberal 
conception of individual rights consigns the concept of af-
firmative action to a role of marginal utility. Moreover, the lack 
of any meaningful distinction between the Court's decisions in 
Grutter and Gratz makes the Court's racial jurisprudence seem 
both arbitrary and capricious. And it may be invidious as well. 
A. RESOURCE REDISTRIBUTION 
In a culture that was free from racial discrimination, one 
would expect to see resources distributed in ways that were ra-
cially proportional. The maldistribution of resources that exists 
in contemporary American culture is, therefore, evidence of con-
tinuing racial discrimination -either active discrimination, or 
more passive acquiescence in the lingering effects of past dis-
crimination. Logically, such discrimination must exist either in 
the selection of the criteria that we use to govern resource allo-
cation; in the manner in which we apply those criteria; or in the 
81. See ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE 
CROSS: THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 217 (1974); LEON F. 
LITWACK, BEEI' IN THE STORM SO LO!':G: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 188-89 (1979); 
see also Alfred L. Brophy, Some Concepwal and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slav-
ery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AMER. L. 497, 521-22 (2003) (discussing argument advanced 
in DAVID HOROWITZ, Ul'CIVIL WARS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER REPARATIO!':S FOR 
SLAVERY (2002) that blacks were made better off by institution of slavery). 
82. See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Could Thomas be Right,? N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2003, 
at A25. 
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training that we provide to satisfy those criteria. This syllogistic 
conclusion can be avoided only if one believes that racial minori-
ties are inherently inferior to whites in their ability to satisfy our 
allocation criteria. And that, of course, would be simply another 
form of racial discrimination. 
If we were serious about racial equality, we would want to 
redistribute societal resources in ways that promoted racial bal-
ance. And we would be willing to use racially proportional 
guidelines and quotas to achieve that racial balance. Race con-
scious efforts to promote racial balance would enable us to ap-
proximate the distribution of resources that would exist in a 
nondiscriminatory culture, which is something that we have not 
otherwise been able to achieve. And treating racial balance as an 
explicit goal would constitute an unambiguous statement of our 
societal goals and priorities, which would be refreshing in its 
candor.83 Racial balance would also constitute a legal standard 
that was easier for policymakers to implement than the current 
affirmative action standards, which require policymakers to 
guess about the Supreme Court's likely response to particular 
uses of race. In fact, I suspect that most organizations wishing to 
promote diversity and avoid unconscious racial discrimination 
have in the past, and would in the future, find racial balancing to 
be a useful prophylactic technique. But most important, racial 
balance is likely to offer the only effective protection against the 
various versions of societal discrimination that are embedded in 
our more traditional resource allocation criteria. Such societal 
discrimination is too ingrained, subtle and pervasive to be con-
fronted directly, but is automatically counteracted by the racially 
proportional allocation of resources. 
Rather than facilitating the redistribution of societal re-
sources in a way that would promote racial balance, the Supreme 
Court has actually held such redistribution to be unlawful. As 
has been noted,84 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter 
states that such a goal "would amount to outright racial balanc-
ing, which is patently unconstitutional. "85 But it is very difficult 
to see why that should be so. The Court states that it is moti-
vated by a desire to ensure that race-conscious remedies are not 
too broad, and are not too burdensome on whites. 86 But that is 
83. Cf. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 304 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, noting 
the benefits of candor in the pursuit of diversity). 
84. See supra text accompanying note 31. 
85. Grutter \'. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
86. See id. at 323-24, citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310 (Powell, J.). 
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nonresponsive. The whole point of racial balance is to stop giv-
ing whites the resources that they have in the past secured 
through societal discrimination, rather than through more le-
gitimate means. The argument that racial balance is bad because 
it would burden whites simply entrenches the problem. 
A more serious justification for the Court's aversion to ra-
cial balancing is that the consideration of race is inconsistent 
with the right that people possess in a liberal culture to be 
treated as individuals rather than as members of a racial group.87 
But that argument is ultimately self-consuming. If allocating re-
sources based on race is a denial of individual rights, then refus-
ing to reallocate resources after they have initially been allo-
cated by race is also a denial of individual rights. Once a culture 
embarks along the path of race-conscious resource allocation-
as American culture did with a vengeance-it creates a zero-sum 
relationship between affirmative action and discrimination that 
cannot be eliminated until racial balance is restored. Whenever 
we allocate a resource, we are either allocating it to whites in a 
way that reinforces societal discrimination, or to racial minorities 
in a way that ameliorates societal discrimination. There is no 
middle ground, because there is no such thing as a race-neutral 
allocation. There is only the pretense of race neutrality that oc-
curs when we elect to use inertia as our preferred form of racial 
discrimination. Which, of course, is precisely what the Supreme 
Court has done by reading the Constitution to prohibit the race-
conscious pursuit of racial balance.88 
Despite the Supreme Court principle of treating people as 
individuals rather than as members of a racial group, it should be 
noted that Grutter does not prohibit the consideration of race in 
the allocation of societal resources. Grutter holds that race can 
be considered, as long as it is treated as a "plus" factor in a "ho-
listic" evaluation of individual attributes, and is not treated me-
chanically as a racial quota.89 In this regard, the Court's ap-
87. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16 (discussing Justice Powell's concern in 
Bakke that individuals not be treated as mere stereotypical members of various racial 
groups). The Supreme Court has gone out of its way to stress that the equal protection 
clause gives rise to individual rather than group rights. See Cruuer, 539 U.S. at 326, citing 
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995). 
88. Race neutrality is also unrealistic in contemporary American culture. Race is a 
characteristic that is simply too salient and too pervasive to be ignored. Try to think 
about things like welfare reform, law-and-order, D.C. statehood, the war in Iraq, or the 
sexual assault charges filed against Kobe Bryant without thinking about race. Race 
should technically have nothing to do with any of those topics, but it realistically has a lot 
to do with them all. 
89. See Cruller, 539 U.S. at 328, 333-36. 
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proach to race in Grutter is similar to its approach in Miller v. 
Johnson,90 where the Court held that race could be considered as 
a factor in the redistricting context as long as it was not the 
"predominant" factor.91 In both instances, the Supreme Court 
has adopted a position that is truly curious. It has rejected the 
polar extremes of prohibiting all consideration of race, or of al-
lowing the express pursuit of racial balance. Instead, it has in ef-
fect adopted the position that race can be considered as long as 
five members of the Court do not think that race has been given 
too much weight. 92 It is striking that the Justices would conclude 
that the Supreme Court was institutionally more competent than 
the policymaking arms of American culture to decide on appro-
priate uses of race, given the Court's historical record on the is-
sue.93 Moreover, the Court's efforts to distinguish between per-
missible and impermissible uses of race do not seem to be 
particularly coherent. 
B. GRVTTER V. GRATZ 
The Supreme Court purports to distinguish between consti-
tutionally permissible and constitutionally impermissible uses of 
race in its contrasting Grutter and Gratz opinions. Grutter up-
holds the race-conscious affirmative action program used by the 
University of Michigan law school.94 It holds that the considera-
tion of race satisfies strict scrutiny if it is used to advance the 
state's compelling interest in promoting student diversity in an 
educational context, and is narrowly tailored in a way that treats 
90. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
91. See id. at 916-17 (articulating "predominant factor" test); see also supra text ac-
companying notes 67-69 (discussing difficulties in viewing race-conscious redistricting as 
violating any individual equal protection right). 
92. This is similar to what the Supreme Court did for a time in obscenity cases, 
when the Court regulated potentially obscene materials by majority vote because it was 
unable to agree on a definition of obscenity. See, e.g., Rcdrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 
769-71(1967) (per curiam). The Court's focus on racial balancing, avoiding quotas and 
ensuring individualized consideration, focuses attention on distracting details and diverts 
attention from the issue of whether the culture favors racial equality or continued socie-
tal discrimination. In this regard, the Court is engaged in classic Kelman-esque legitima-
tion. The Court's predominant regulatory agenda is implemented beneath the radar, be-
cause the culture's attention is focused on the details rather than the thrust of the Court's 
actions. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 269-95 (1987) (de-
scribing cognitive model of legitimation); see also GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE 
AGAINST THE CouRT 151-59 (describing Supreme Court legitimation techniques in ra-
cial context). 
93. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64 (describing historical Supreme Court 
decisions that were hostile to the interests of racial minorities). 
94. See Grutrer, 539 U.S. at 343-44. 
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race as only one of many factors in an individualized considera-
tion of each applicant's relative merits.95 It is this "holistic" use 
of race as a "plus" factor rather than as an inflexible percentage 
"quota" that ensures that race is not being used in a way that 
"makes an applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of 
his or her application. "96 Moreover, this individualized consid-
eration, as part of a program that has "a logical end point," en-
sures that the use of race does not impose an undue burden on 
innocent whites.97 
Gratz invalidates the race-conscious affirmative action pro-
gram used by the University of Michigan undergraduate col-
lege.98 It reaffirms that diversit¥ can be a compelling state inter-
est in an educational context,9 but holds that the use of race-
conscious affirmative action does not satisfy the narrow tailoring 
requirement for strict scrutiny if it results in the award of a fixed 
number of points to each minority applicant. 100 Such a mechani-
cal award of points is inconsistent with the individualized con-
sideration required by the equal protection clause because it 
"has the effect of making 'the factor of race ... decisive' for virtu-
ally every minimally qualified underrepresented minority appli-
cant.'"01 Under the facts of Gratz, the award of points was likely 
to be dispositive because the undergraduate program awarded 
20 points to racial minorities (out of the 100 necessary to secure 
admission), even though it would award only 5 points to an ap-
plicant whose '"extraordinary artistic talent' rivaled that of 
Monet or Picasso." 102 
Although the affirmative action programs at issue in Grutter 
and Gratz met different constitutional fates, the two programs 
are analytically indistinguishable. As columnist Michael Kinsley 
has pointed out, for any individual applicant, race is either dispo-
95. See id. at 333-44. 
96. See id. at335-37. 
97. See id. at 342-43. The ''logical end point"' for the Michigan law school program 
appears to have been provided by Justice O'Connor's belief that such programs will no 
longer be necessary 25 years from now. See id. at 343. In fact, Justice Thomas actually 
concurred in "the Court's holding that racial discrimination in higher education admis-
sions will be illegal in 25 years." See id. at 351 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). If this is indeed part of the Court's ''holding," it suggests that the constitu-
tionality of an affirmative action plan can be saved through the Court's imposition of an 
informal sunset provision. 
98. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2lXJ3). 
99. See id. at 247. 
100. See id. at269. 
101. See id. at 271, quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 
(1978) (Powell, J.) (ellipsis in original). 
102. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at273, quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at324 (Powell, J.). 
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sitive or it is not. This is true no matter how many factors go into 
an admissions decision. And it is true whether race is used holis-
tically in connection with a flexible admissions process, or me-
chanically in connection with a mathematical score. 103 Therefore, 
the differences that exist between the ways in which race was 
used in Grutter and in Gratz are simply irrelevant to any consti-
tutionally protected individual right. If it is constitutionally per-
missible for race to determine the fate of an applicant, that ap-
plicant's fate is not changed by the details of the program that 
gave rise to the consideration of race. 104 
The manner in which race is used can, of course, change the 
statistical effect that race will have on an overall admissions 
process, as well as the probability that members of a given race 
will be admitted to a particular school. An affirmative action 
program in which race is permitted to play a large role can result 
in the admission of more minorities than a program in which 
race is permitted to play only a small role. Assuming for the sake 
of argument that the Grutter and Gratz programs do differ in the 
number of applicants for which they will permit race to be dis-
positive, that difference still cannot be constitutionally signifi-
cant. Because the Supreme Court insists that the egual protec-
tion clause protects individuals rather than groups, 105 the statisti-
cal impact of an affirmative action program on particular racial 
groups is beside the point. The fact that an affirmative action 
plan produced an increase in the number of minority students is 
no more relevant than the fact that the Court's invalidation of 
that plan would produce an identical increase in the number of 
white students. Both statistics might be relevant to a concept of 
racially-correlated group rights, but neither is relevant to the 
concept of individual rights that the Supreme Court deems to be 
controlling. 
103. See Michael Kinsley, Want Diversicy? Think Fuzzy, WASH. POST, June 25,2003, 
at A23. To the extent that a "holistic" admissions process might seem intuitively different 
from a more mechanical process, that intuition is likely to be nothing more than a func-
tion of the size of the applicant pool. It is possible to compare a small number of appli-
cants without using mechanical sorting devices such as the numerical scores utilized in 
Gracz, but it is difficult to sec how a large number of applicants can be compared without 
using some sort of scoring system. See infra, text accompanying note 114. 
104. It is worth noting that seven Justices voted in ways that treated Gruuer and 
Gracz as indistinguishable. Only Justices O'Connor and Breyer saw constitutionally sig-
nificant differences between the two cases. Compare Gracz, 539 U.S. at 247 (listing votes 
of Justices) wich Gruccer, 539 U.S. at 310 (listing votes of Justices). 
105. See Grwcer, 539 U.S. at 324, 326 (equal protection clause protects personal 
rights rather than group rights). 
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One might be tempted to argue that the statistical impact of 
racial affirmative action on an overall admissions process can be 
translated into a violation of an individual right, because it re-
duces the probability that any particular white applicant will be 
admitted to the program at issue. In order for that argument to 
prevail, however, the Constitution would have to guarantee indi-
viduals some particular probability of admission, either in abso-
lute terms or relative to other races. The Constitution does not, 
of course, guarantee individuals any probability of admission in 
absolute terms, and if it were read as guaranteeing a probability 
of admission relative to other races, the Constitution would re-
quire precisely the racial balance that Grutter finds to be "pat-
ently unconstitutional." 106 
On a less abstract level, it is likely that the Grutter and 
Gratz affirmative action programs are very similar in actual op-
eration. Grutter holds that the Michigan law school program is 
sufficiently individualized to satisfy the narrow tailoring re-
quirement of strict scrutiny. 107 Justice Rehnquist, however, ar-
gues convincingly that the program is really about racial bal-
ance.108 The stated justificatior.. for the law school program was 
to enroll a "critical mass" of minority students sufficient to pro-
mote a meaningful exchange of ideas among students, and to en-
sure that minority students did not feel isolated or like spokes-
persons for their race. But in reality, the law school ended up 
admitting percentages of minority students that closely corre-
sponded to the percentages of minority students in the law 
school applicant pool. A majority of the underprivileged minor-
ity students were black; half that number were Latino; and one-
sixth of the number were indigenous Indians. Justice Rehnquist 
notes that if the true goal of the program were to ensure the ad-
mission of a critical mass, there would not be such a large, ra-
cially proportional variation among the number of minority stu-
dents admitted. He also emphasizes that the tiny number of 
Indian students admitted could not meaningfully be considered a 
critical mass. 109 Justice Kennedy also asserts that the law school's 
increased use near the end of the admissions season of daily re-
ports showing the racial breakdown of admitted students sug-
106. See id. at 330. 
107. See id. at 333-44. 
108. See id. at 379-85 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
109. See id; see also id. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in pan and dissenting in part, 
argumg that law school program was really designed to achieve racial balance); id. at 388-
90 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (same). 
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gests that the law school was pursuing racial balance in a fairly 
automatic manner. 110 Therefore, the manner in which the law 
school treats race in the program that the Grutter Court upholds, 
ultimately seems as mechanical as the manner in which the un-
dergraduate coHeRe treats race in the program that the Gratz 
Court invalidates. 1 
Similarly, Gratz holds that the Michigan undergraduate 
program is too mechanical in its consideration of race to satisfy 
the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny. Justice 
Souter, however, points out that the undergraduate affirmative 
action pror:ram is actually more individualized than the majority 
concedes. 1 2 Unlike the program struck down in Bakke, every 
applicant gets to compete for every seat under the Michigan un-
dergraduate program. Moreover, race is only one of a number of 
factors that are taken into account in the pursuit of diversity, and 
the number of points awarded to racial minorities is the same as 
the number of points awarded for other diversity factors such as 
outstanding athletic ability. In addition, the undergraduate pro-
gram gives admissions officers the discretion to "flag" applica-
tions for more individualized attention when they believe that 
numerical scores alone do not adequately capture important 
characteristics. Justice Souter also notes that the undergraduate 
program provides for more individualized consideration of ap-
plicants than the fixed percentage plans the Solicitor General fa-
vored as a race-neutral alternative. 113 Law professors probably 
find it easy to understand why the Michigan undergraduate pro-
gram assigned a numerical value to the factor of race. It is simi-
lar to the manner in which professors commonly assign nu-
merical values to particular arguments in grading exams. Those 
professors would certainly claim that they were giving individu-
alized consideration to each exam, but the use of numerical 
scores greatly facilitates that individualized consideration. 114 
Therefore, the manner in which the undergraduate program ul-
timately treats race seems as individualized as the way in which 
110. See id. at 390-94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Note, however, that Justice 
O'Connor's majority opinion appears to dispute the accuracy of Justice Kennedy's asser-
tion. See id. at 336. 
Ill. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 267-77 (2lXl3) (invalidating undergraduate 
affirmative action program). 
112. See id. at 291-92 (Souter, J ., dissenting). 
113. See id. 
114. To the extent that Gratz stands for the proposition that automatic numerical 
values cannot be used in the process of evaluating a large pool of applicants for admis-
sion, it is like telling a professor that he or she must undertake the Herculean task of 
grading 10,000 exams without using points. 
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race is actually treated under the law school program that the 
Court upheld in Grutter. 115 
The real difference between the law school program upheld 
in Grutter and the undergraduate program invalidated in Gratz 
seems to be that the Supreme Court believes that the Gratz pro-
gram gave too much weight to the factor of race, and it did so in 
a manner that was too transparent. That is what the Monel-and-
Picasso example seems to illustrate in Justice Rehnquist's major-
ity opinion in Gratz, 116 and that is what seems to bother Justice 
O'Connor in her Gratz concurrence. 117 I suspect that in actual 
operation, both programs would end up admitting largely the 
same individual minority students, and would therefore have the 
same general effect on white applicants. But even if I am wrong 
about this, it is unlikely that differences in the weight given to 
the factor of race within the range of these two programs could 
rise to a level of constitutional significance. 
There is a real irony in the emphasis that both cases place 
on the use of points and numerical goals, with Grutter findin~ 
that such a use of numbers did not play an impermissible role, 11 
and Gratz finding that it did. 119 The thing that the Court finds 
troubling about numbers is their potential to serve as quotas that 
insulate minority apglicants from competition in order to pro-
mote racial balance. 20 But that concern seems backwards. As-
suming that minorities are not inherently inferior to whites, we 
would expect a nondiscriminatory "holistic" admissions pro-
gram, that was designed to promote diversity, to end up with a 
racially proportional allocation of seats. However, if a program 
attempts to use numerical methods to facilitate that goal (as in 
Gratz), the program is unconstitutional because of its resem-
blance to a quota. Therefore, in order for a program to be consti-
tutionally acceptable (as in Grutter), it will have to take great 
pains to ensure that its consideration of diversity factors does not 
produce results that make it look like quotas were used. The 
only way to do this reliably is by taking conscious precautions to 
ensure that the numerical percentages of minority admissions 
115. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-44 (upholding law school affirmative aclion pro-
gram). 
116. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273; see also supra. text accompanying note 102. 
117. See id. at 279-86 (O'Connor, J., concurring, noting high number of points 
awarded to racial minorities relative to number of points awarded for some other diver-
sity factors). 
118. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335-36. 
119. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 269-74. 
120. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 335-36. 
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vary from year to year, and do not correspond too closely to the 
percentages of various racial groups in the applicant pool or in 
the general population. Thus, the use of a "floating" racial quota 
will be necessary to ensure that the program looks like a valid 
holistic program, rather than an invalid quota program that was 
intended to promote racial balance. 121 Since the institution will 
have to pay a lot of attention to numbers either way, it is a bit 
perverse to say that a program is valid only if it gives more con-
sideration to numbers in order to create the impression that it 
gave less consideration to numbers. In this regard, the Gratz 
program is probably more honest than the Gruffer program-
which is what makes it unconstitutional. 122 A Supreme Court 
rule that produces such a result cannot be a proper rule of con-
stitutional law unless our goal is to promote disingenuousness, 
which, as Justice Thomas suggests, may well be the case. 123 
There is no constitutionally significant difference between 
the Grutter and Gratz programs. Gratz is simply more honest 
than Gruffer, which demands an unfortunate charade. The de-
gree to which numbers are used mechanically as opposed to 
121. There may even be an incentive to reject highly qualified minorities-especially 
those who arc likely to end up actually attending more prestigious schools-in order to 
show that a school is using highly individualized admissions standards rather than quotas. 
That allows a school to demonstrate that it has admitted white students with lower scores 
than some of the minority students who were rejected. See Cruller, 539 U.S. at 338 (fo-
cusing on acceptance of white applicants with lower scores than rejected minority appli-
cants as evidence of individualized consideration). 
122. This irony was not lost on Justice Ginsburg. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting, noting benefits of candor in Michigan undergraduate affirmative ac-
tion program). 
123. Cf Cruller, 539 U.S. at 371-72 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, arguing that law school program seeks only "facade" of class that "looks right"). 
Justice O'Connor's aversion to the usc of numbers in Gratz, 539 U.S. at 277-80, is 
ironically inconsistent with the Justice O'Connor's own usc of numbers in Cruller, sug-
gesting that 25 more years of affirmative action will be enough. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 
343. Presumably, Justice O'Connor chose that 25 year number because 25 years is the 
amount of time that had elapsed between the 1978 decision in Bakke and the 2003 deci-
sion in Grutter. That is a pretty "mechanical" and •·mathematical" manner in which to 
decide how long affirmative action will continue to be constitutionally permissible. Why 
not instead permit affirmative action to be used for another 350 years, as an approxima-
tion of the time that elapsed between the introduction of slavery in the Colonies and the 
time of the Grutter decision? It also seems unrealistic to think that continuing societal 
discrimination will permit the United States to achieve any meaningful level of racial 
equality in next 25 years, after having failed to do so for centuries. Moreover, Justice 
O'Connor's endorsement of a time-period test, rather than some sort of functiOnal test, 
for the continued validity of affirmative action is in tension with her rejection of a me-
chanical trimester test in favor of a more functional "undue burden" test to define the 
scope of the constitutionally protected right to abortion. See Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-79 (1992) Uoint opinion of O'Connor, Ken-
nedy and Souter, H). 
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flexibly in the pursuit of racial diversity, hardly seems to be a 
matter of constitutional significance. And the argument that we 
should hide our conscious consideration of race in order to con-
vey the impression that race is a less salient characteristic in con-
temporary culture than it really is seems counterproductive. The 
whole point should be to highlight our race consciousness so that 
we can no longer complacently pretend that we live in a race-
neutral culture. Grutter and Gratz allow the continued use of 
race-conscious affirmative action, but only with the under-
standing that it will not be used in ways that make any systemic 
modifications in the current allocation of resources. The opin-
ions take great pains to ensure that the continuing effects of so-
cietal discrimination will remain beyond the reach of race-
conscious remedies. And that, in turn, perpetuates the invidious 
discrimination against racial minorities that has always charac-
terized American culture. The Supreme Court is unwilling to 
concede that American culture is structurally discriminatory. But 
the recognition of continuing structural discrimination seems 
like the most important thing that is at stake in the affirmative 
action debate. In a sense, Grutter and Gratz may present the 
worst of both worlds for racial minorities. They leave open the 
possibility that affirmative action will sometimes be consti-
tutionally permissible, thereby preventing racial minorities from 
becoming too unruly. But under the prevailing standards, truly 
beneficial affirmative action programs will rarely be upheld in 
r~ality. That is not a bad strategy for continued racial oppres-
Sion. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's recent affirmative action decisions in 
Grutter and Gratz reaffirm the limited availability of race-
conscious affirmative action to make modest adjustments in the 
allocation of societal resources. However, they also reaffirm the 
Court's explicit prohibition on the use of affirmative action to 
redress the pervasive "societal discrimination" that continues to 
harm racial minorities. The pursuit of racial balance in the allo-
cation of societal resources offers the only realistic hope of ever 
solving the problem of systemic racial discrimination in the 
United States. But that is precisely the remedy that the Supreme 
Court has chosen to view as constitutionally impermissible. As a 
result, the Court is now able to use the concept of prospective 
race neutrality as a means of freezing existing racial inequalities 
in the distribution of resources. And it is able to do so while pur-
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porting to advance the abstract goal of racial equality. Because 
the Supreme Court has a long history of sacrificing racial minor-
ity rights for the advancement of white majority interests, it is at 
least curious that we would continue to endorse a model of judi-
cial review that permitted the Supreme Court to formulate racial 
policy for the Nation. It is as if our commitment to the principle 
of racial equality were as disingenuous now as it has been 
throughout so much of our history. 
